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Education

PhD in Economics, Lund University, 2012-2017 (expected).

Thesis title: "Self-Image and Economic Behavior"

Visiting Research Student, New York University (hosted by Andrew Caplin), 2014-2015.

MSc in Economics, Lund University, 2010-2012.

BSc (Mathematics)/BCom (Economics, Finance), The University of Sydney, 2005-2009.

Exchange Program in Mathematics, Uppsala University, 2006.

References

Håkan J. Holm

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Lund University
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Andrew Caplin

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New York University
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Research and Teaching Interests

Primary: Behavioral Economics, Experimental Economics.

Secondary: Applied Microeconomics, Industrial Organization.

Teaching Experience

Pedagogical Qualification

Learning and Teaching in Higher Education, Spring 2016.

Graduate, Lund University

Advanced Microeconomic Analysis (TA): Fall 2015, Fall 2016.

Economic and Financial Decision Making (TA): Fall 2013, Fall 2015, Fall 2016.

Mathematical Methods – Dynamic Optimization (TA): Fall 2013.

Undergraduate, The University of Sydney

Intermediate Microeconomics (TA): Fall 2010.

Introductory Macroeconomics (TA): Spring 2009.

Introductory Microeconomics (TA): Fall 2009.

Business and Economic Statistics B (Lab Assistant): Spring 2009.

Business and Economic Statistics A (Lab Assistant): Fall 2009, Spring 2009.

Scholarships and Grants

Scholarship, The Pontus Roos Memorial Foundation, 2016.

Scholarship, Institute of Economic Research, 2016.

Self-Image and Economic Behavior Research Grant, Jan Wallanders och Tom Hedelius Stiftelse, 2014.

Hedelius Scholarship for Postgraduate Studies Abroad, Jan Wallanders och Tom Hedelius Stiftelse, 2013.

Dr Wilhelm Håkansson's Scholarship, Helsingkrona Nation, 2012.

Lucia Scholarship, Skånska Nationerna, 2011.

International Exchange Scholarship, The University of Sydney, 2006.

Mathematics Entry Scholarship, The University of Sydney, 2005.

Professional Activities

2016: Secretary to the Organizing Committee, Arne Ryde Workshop on “Identity, Image and Economic Behavior” (Lund).

Reviewer: Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics.

Publications

Kahsay, G. A. and Samahita, M. (2015). Pay-What-You-Want pricing schemes: a self-image perspective. *Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Finance*, 7:17–28.

Samahita, M. (2013). Effect of effort on self-image: monotonically increasing self-image functions. *Economics Bulletin*, 33(1):152–157.

Research Papers

“Curating social image: experimental evidence on the value of actions and selfies” with Håkan J. Holm (Job Market Paper)

Abstract: We manipulate the information subjects can share on the web concerning socially sensitive actions (public good contribution) and visibility (selfie) to determine the effect on social image, as captured by the price subjects demand for publication. The overall conclusion from the experiment is that theory about social reputation can predict subjects’ social-signaling behavior. People take costly decisions to “filter” information about themselves (in retrospect) before it is published. We also report results of a more exploratory nature and find that taking a selfie has a strong negative impact on cooperation among

frequent selfie takers, but not on other subjects.

“Venting and gossiping in conflicts: emotion expression in ultimatum games” *R&R at Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics*

Abstract: Conflicts often lead to expression of emotion to unrelated parties. We study non-instrumental emotion expression in binary ultimatum games, where receivers can express emotion either privately or to a third-party audience prior to accepting or rejecting the offer. The possibility of emotion expression to an audience increases welfare, but this is driven by senders behaving more fairly rather than any change in receivers’ behaviour. We thus show that the role of emotion expression in increasing co-operation is mainly driven by the punishment motive. There is demand for emotion expression even when it is unobserved, this is motivated by low self-esteem.

“Pay-what-you-want in competition”

Abstract: Pay-What-You-Want (PWYW) pricing schemes are popular in certain industries and not others. We model the seller’s choice of pricing scheme under various market structures assuming consumers share their surplus. We show that the profitability and popularity of PWYW depend not only on consumers’ preferences, but also on market structure, product characteristics and sellers’ strategies. While there is no equilibrium where PWYW dominates the market, given a sufficiently high level of surplus-sharing and product differentiation, it is chosen by the second mover to avoid Bertrand competition. The equilibrium results and their associated market characteristics are consistent with empirical examples of PWYW.